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For the problem of adjudicating con°icting claims, we o®er simple
criteria to compare rules on the basis of the Lorenz order. These cri-
teria pertain to three families of rules. The ¯rst family contains the
constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, Talmud, and min-
imal overlap rules (Thomson, 2007a). The second family, which also
contains the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses
rules, is obtained from the ¯rst one by exchanging, for each problem,
how well agents with relatively larger claims are treated as compared
to agents with relatively smaller claims. The third family consists of
consistent rules (Young, 1987). We also address the issue whether
certain operators on the space of rules preserve the Lorenz order.
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21 Introduction
When several agents have claims on a resource adding up to more than is
available, what should be done with what is available of the resource? For
example, when a ¯rm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be
divided among its creditors? A \division rule" is a function that associates
with each such problem a recommendation for it. Alternatively, think of a tax
authority having to raise a certain amount of money from taxpayers whose
incomes di®er, in order to cover the cost of some public project. How much
should each taxpayer be assessed? This problem is mathematically identical
to the problem of claims adjudication, but we will use language that ¯ts
that second interpretation, calling the data de¯ning a problem \claims" and
\endowment", and calling the amount assigned to an agent his \award".1
Our goal is to develop criteria to perform Lorenz comparisons of rules. An
important issue when evaluating a rule is how di®erentially it treats agents
with relatively large claims as compared to claimants with relatively small
claims. The Lorenz order is commonly used to evaluate income distributions
and it is just as natural in the context of claims adjudication. Because
rules are complex objects, one should not expect to be able to make Lorenz
comparisons of any two rules very generally, independently of the data of the
problem. The comparisons may depend on the speci¯c values claims take,
the endowment, the number of claimants, and even their identities. In fact,
for each speci¯c problem, the awards vectors chosen by two rules may not
be Lorenz comparable. Nevertheless, one may hope that within structured
classes of rules, such comparisons would be feasible. The main results of
this paper ful¯ll this hope, as they concern three families of rules that are
su±ciently wide as to contain all of the rules that have been most often
discussed in the literature.
A great variety of rules have indeed been proposed, motivated by a broad
range of considerations, but several unifying principles can be invoked to
organize them into families. We start with a family of rules (Thomson,
2000) whose de¯nition is quite simple and intuitive|and in fact it expresses
a fairly widely held view of how this type of problems should be solved|yet
the family is rich enough to contain a number of important rules, rules that
at ¯rst sight do not all appear to be related. They are the \constrained
equal awards rule" and the \constrained equal losses rule", both already
1For a survey of the literature on this subject, see Thomson (2003, 2007c).
1familiar to Maimonides (12th Century); the \Talmud rule" (Aumann and
Maschler, 1985), proposed to rationalize certain numerical examples found in
the Talmud (O'Neill, 1982); and the \minimal overlap rule" (O'Neill, 1982),
which is an extension2 of an incompletely speci¯ed medieval rule (Rabad,
12th Century). The second family is a counterpart of the ¯rst family in which
relatively small claims and relatively large claims are treated in a reverse way
to how they are treated in the ¯rst family. It contains the constrained equal
awards and constrained equal losses rules. (These two rules are the only ones
the two families have in common.) (Section 2)
The main ingredient in the de¯nitions of the two families is the basic idea
of equality, applied recursively either to the amounts claimants receive or to
the losses they incur. Fix the claims vector and let the endowment grow. For
the ¯rst family, initially all claimants are present to partake in the division;
as the endowment increases, they drop out in the order of increasing claims
until one claimant is left and he is the only one present for a while; they
then return for more in the reverse order (Subsection 3.2). For the second
family, they arrive to receive a share in the order of decreasing claims, each
claimant staying until he is fully compensated; they drop out in the order
of increasing claims (Subsection 3.3). For both families, all agents who are
present at a given time partake equally in the division of each increment. The
richness of the families comes from the freedom in choosing where claimants
are dropped o® and invited back in (or conversely, for the second family),
and in particular, from the fact that these drop-o® and pick-up points are
allowed to depend on the claims vector.
The third family is de¯ned by means of a property its members satisfy,
called \consistency".3 Let a rule be given. Consider a problem, and apply the
rule to solve it. Then imagine that some claimants leave with their awards,
and reassess the situation. This situation can be seen as a \reduced problem"
with fewer claimants and a smaller endowment. The requirement is that for
this problem, the rule should assign the same amount to each remaining
claimant as it did initially. Several of the aforementioned examples, such as
the constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and Talmud rules,
are consistent. So are Piniles' rule (Piniles, 1861), which was an early, only
partially successful, attempt at producing the numbers in the Talmud, the
2Another extension of Ibn Ezra's suggestion is proposed by Berganti~ nos and M¶ endez-
Naya (2001) and Alcalde, Marco, and Silva (2005).
3For a survey of the applications of the \consistency principle", see Thomson (2007b).
2constrained egalitarian rule (Chun, Schummer, and Thomson, 2001), which
o®ers another implementation of the idea of equality subject to constraints,
and of course the proportional rule. The minimal overlap rule is not however.
For each of the three families, we formulate a general and simple criterion
that allows Lorenz comparisons of their members. In addition to recovering a
number of elementary rankings, we obtain several non trivial ones. A special
case of our result concerning the ¯rst family is that the Talmud rule Lorenz
dominates the minimal overlap rule. Another is a complete Lorenz ranking
of the members of a one-parameter family of rules, a subfamily of the ICI
family, proposed by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006b) as a generalization
of the constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and Talmud rules
(Section 4). Such a ranking is derived by these authors (Moreno-Ternero
and Villar, 2006a) by direct calculation. We also derive a complete Lorenz
ranking of the members of a one-parameter subfamily of the second family
de¯ned in parallel manner. (In both cases, the parameter is a point in the
unit interval.)
Our results pertaining to consistency involve proving that, using Hokari
and Thomson's (2000) terminology, Lorenz domination is \lifted" by consis-
tency from the two-claimant case to the case of arbitrarily many claimants
for all rules satisfying a pair of elementary properties: this means that given
two consistent rules satisfying these properties, if one of them Lorenz domi-
nates the other in the two-claimant case, its domination extends to arbitrarily
many claimants. Then, to establish Lorenz domination in general, it su±ces
to check the two-claimant case, which is trivial. Applications of this result
are numerous because many rules are consistent. In particular we obtain
rankings of several important rules. We also recover the Lorenz ranking of
the members of the Moreno-Ternero{Villar family (2006b) and the ranking
of the reverse family, both rankings already derived from their membership
in the ICI and CIC families (Section 5).
We complete this study by exploiting the notion of an \operator" on the
space of rules. This is a mapping that associates with each rule another
one (Thomson and Yeh, 2001). Operators are very useful in structuring the
space of rules. Given two rules that are Lorenz ordered, one should know if
their images under an operator are ordered too. We consider three operators.
Given a rule S, the \claims truncation operator" associates with S the rule
obtained, for each problem, by applying S to the derived problem in which
claims have been truncated at the endowment. The \attribution of minimal
3rights operator" associates with S the rule that gives, for each problem, the
awards vector in two steps: ¯rst, each agent receives the di®erence between
the endowment and the sum of the claims of the others (or 0 if this di®erence
is negative); second, he receives what S would give him in the division of
the remainder, claims having been adjusted down by the ¯rst installements.
The \duality operator" associates with S the rule that, for each problem,
divides the endowment as S divides the de¯cit. We show that the ¯rst
operator preserves the Lorenz order, the second one generally preserves it,
and the third one reverses it. Finally, we provide a Lorenz domination result
pertaining to each rule satisfying some basic properties and the rule obtained
from it by subjecting it to any one of these operators (Section 6).
Bosmans and Lauwers (2007) address the same questions but the main
thrust of their approach is to identify a certain rule as being Lorenz minimal
(or Lorenz maximal) within a certain class of rules, de¯ned by means of a list
of properties they share. They o®er several characterizations of this type.
Some of the rankings they obtain as corollaries are rankings also derived in
the present paper. We comment in greater detail on their contribution at the
relevant points. Of course, some rules cannot be Lorenz ordered. Showing
that, given a pair of rules, neither one Lorenz dominates the other is achieved
by means of examples. A number of such examples can be found in Bosmans
and Lauwers (2007), settling the issue of dominance in the negative for several
important pairs.
There has been a growing interest in the distributional properties of di-
vision rules. Other papers on the subject are by Hougaard and Âsterdal
(2005), and Ju and Moreno-Ternero (2006, 2007).
2 The model of claims resolution. Lorenz
domination
A group N = f1;:::;ng of agents have claims on a resource, ci 2 R+ being
the claim of agent i 2 N and c ´ (ci)i2N the claims vector. Claims are
ordered so that c1 · ¢¢¢ · cn. There is an endowment E of the resource
that is insu±cient to honor all of the claims. Using the notation RN
+ for the
cross-product of n copies of R+ indexed by the members of N, a claims prob-
lem, or simply a problem, is a pair (c;E) 2 RN
+ £ R+ such that
P
ci ¸ E.
Let CN denote the domain of all problems.
4A division rule, or simply a rule, is a function that associates with each
problem (c;E) 2 CN a vector x 2 RN satisfying the non-negativity and claims
boundedness inequalities 0 5 x 5 c and the e±ciency equality
P
xi = E.
Such an x is an awards vector for (c;E). Let X(c;E) be the set of these
vectors.
An important way to compare rules is by means of how evenly distributed
the awards they select are. Is a rule relatively favorable to claimants with
large claims or to claimants with small claims? In the theory concerning
the measurement of income inequality, a number of partial orders have been
de¯ned to perform comparisons of income distributions.4 The central one
is based on the successive sums of ordered incomes, and the obvious way to
apply it here is to consider successive sums of ordered awards, as follows. Let





Then, x is greater than y in the Lorenz order, which we write as x ÂL y,
if x1 ¸ y1, x1 + x2 ¸ y1 + y2, x1 + x2 + x3 ¸ y1 + y2 + y3, and so on, with at
least one strict inequality. We also say then that x Lorenz dominates y. If
the successive partial sums are equal for the two vectors, x and y are Lorenz
equivalent. If either x ÂL y or these vectors are Lorenz equivalent, we write
x ºL y. A rule S Lorenz dominates a rule S0 if for each (c;E) 2 CN,
S(c;E) ºL S0(c;E), and there is (c;E) 2 CN such that S(c;E) ÂL S0(c;E).
We then write S ÂL S0. Also, S and S0 are Lorenz-equivalent if for each
(c;E) 2 CN, S(c;E) and S0(c;E) are Lorenz-equivalent. Finally, if S ÂL S0
or S and S0 are Lorenz equivalent, we write S ºL S0.
We leave it to the reader's judgment how di®erences in claims should be
re°ected in awards vectors. Our goal here is simply to help in this evaluation,
by developing general criteria to determine, within broad families, whether
two rules are comparable in the Lorenz order.
3 Rules and families of rules
First, we describe several rules, and families of rules, that will be covered by
our main theorems.
4One is based on the gap between the smallest and largest awards; another on the
variance of the awards. Comparisons of rules on the basis of either gap or variance are
presented by Schummer and Thomson (1997) and Chun, Schummer, and Thomson (2001).
53.1 Four central rules
The following rules are central in the literature.
Constrained equal awards rule, CEA: For each (c;E) 2 CN and each
i 2 N, CEAi(c;E) ´ minfci;¸g, where ¸ is chosen so as to achieve e±ciency.
Constrained equal losses rule, CEL: For each (c;E) 2 CN and each
i 2 N, CELi(c;E) ´ maxf0;ci ¡ ¸g, where ¸ is chosen so as to achieve
e±ciency.
Talmud rule, T: (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) For each (c;E) 2 CN and











where in each case, ¸ is chosen so as to achieve e±ciency.
Minimal overlap rule, MO: (O'Neill, 1982) Claims on speci¯c parts
of the endowment are arranged so that the part claimed by exactly one
claimant (whoever that claimant is; di®erent \subparts" may be claimed by
di®erent claimants) is maximized, and for each k = 2;:::;n¡1 successively,
subject to the ¯rst k maximizations being solved, the part claimed by exactly
k + 1 claimants (whoever these claimants are; di®erent subparts may be
claimed by di®erent groups of k + 1 claimants) is maximized. Once claims
are arranged in this way, for each part of the endowment, equal division
prevails among all agents claiming it. Each claimant receives the sum of the
partial compensations assigned to him for the various parts that he claimed.
Formulas for the rule are available (O'Neill, 1982; Chun and Thomson,
2005; Alcalde, Marco, and Silva, 2007).
3.2 The ICI family
The considerations underlying the de¯nition of the minimal overlap rule seem
to be far removed from those that underlie the constrained equal awards, con-
strained equal losses, and Talmud rules. However, by plotting for each claims
vector the awards they recommend as a function of the endowment, one notes
similarities. The award to each claimant increases initially, then it remains
6constant for a while, then it increases again until he is fully compensated;
given two claimants, the interval of constancy for the one with the smaller
claim contains the interval of constancy for the one with the larger claim;
¯nally, any two awards that are increasing at any given moment do so at the
same rate. Let us consider all rules exhibiting these features. We designate
the family they constitute by the name of \Increasing-Constant-Increasing"
family, or ICI family for short (the interval in which each claimant's award
is increasing can be subdivided into subintervals in which the rate of increase
is constant; for the one with the largest claim, the interval in which his award
stays ¯xed is degenerate).
Proceeding in this way is easily justi¯ed by recursive application of the
widely held view that for a small endowment, di®erences in claims should be
judged irrelevant. Then equal shares are appealing as providing \consolation
prizes". Starting with equal division, as E increases, at some point|let F1(c)
denote the value of E at which this occurs|claimant 1's award is perceived
as being too large in relation to his claim, so he is dropped o®. Di®erences in
the claims of the others might still be judged irrelevant for a while, and we
continue with equal division for them until|let F2(c) denote the value of E
at which this occurs|it is felt that claimant 2's award is too large in relation
to his claim. Then, he is dropped o® too and we continue with equal division
for the remaining n¡2 claimants, and so on. We proceed until agent n¡1 has
been dropped o®|let Fn¡1(c) denote the value of E at which this occurs. To
complete the description of the rule, it is convenient to start with E =
P
ci
and let E decrease (and the de¯cit, namely the di®erence between E and P
ci, grow). This time, we focus on the losses claimants incur. The de¯cit is
initially divided equally among all agents until it is felt that claimant 1's loss
is too large in relation to his claim|let G1(c) denote the value of E at which
this occurs. The next increments in the de¯cit are divided equally among
claimants 2,..., n until agent 2 is dropped o®|let G2(c) denote the value
of E at which this occurs; we proceed until agent n ¡ 1 is dropped o®|let
Gn¡1(c) denote the value of E at which this occurs. When E decreases from
Gn¡1(c) to Fn¡1(c), agent n if the only one to have to absorb incremental
de¯cits. Equivalently, when E increases from Fn¡1(c) to Gn¡1(c), agent n is
the only recipient of each new unit.
The freedom in de¯ning the rules comes from that of choosing the various
points at which claimants are dropped o® and picked up again, and the fact
that these drop-o® and pick-up points may depend on the claims vector.
These parameters are not independent however. Indeed, claimant 1's award
7increases twice, at Step 1 by
F1(c)
n , and at Step 2n ¡ 1 (the last step) by
P
ci¡G1(c)





n = c1. Claimant 2's award
increases along with claimant 1's award on both occasions and at the same
rate, also for a total of c1; in addition, it increases at Step 2 by
F2(c)¡F1(c)
n¡1 and
at Step 2n¡2 by
G1(c)¡G2(c)




n¡1 = c2. Similar
statements can be made about the other claimants. For the last agent, we
obtain cn¡1 + Gn¡1(c) ¡ Fn¡1(c) = cn.
Summarizing, here is the general de¯nition of the family. Its members
are indexed by a list H ´ (Fk;Gk)
n¡1
k=1 of pairs of functions from RN
+ to R
such that for each c 2 RN
+, (Fk(c))
n¡1
k=1 is nowhere decreasing, (Gk(c))
n¡1
k=1 is
nowhere increasing, G1(c) ·
P
ci, and the following ICI relations hold.
For convenience, we introduce c0 ´ 0, F0(c) ´ 0, G0(c) ´
P
ci, and Fn(c) =






The ICI relations are not independent; multiplying the ¯rst one through
by n, the second one by n¡1, ..., and the last one by 1, gives new relations
whose sum is an identity. If several agents have equal claims, the ICI relations
imply that successive Fk's are equal and that so are the corresponding Gk's.
Then, agents with equal claims drop out and come back together. Let HN
denote the family of lists H ´ (Fk;Gk)
n¡1
k=1 of pairs of functions satisfying the
ICI relations.
Here is the formal de¯nition of the ICI family (Thomson, 2007a):
ICI rule relative to H ´ (Fk;Gk)
k=n¡1
k=1 2 HN, SH: For each c 2
RN
+ with c1 · ¢¢¢ · cn, the awards vector chosen by SH is calculated as
follows. As E ¯rst increases from 0 to F1(c), equal division prevails; as
E increases from F1(c) to F2(c), claimant 1's award remains constant, and
equal division of each increment prevails among the others. As E increases
from F2(c) to F3(c), claimants 1 and 2's awards remain constant, and equal
division of each increment prevails among the others...This goes on until
E reaches Fn¡1(c). As E increases from Fn¡1(c) to Gn¡1(c), each increment
goes entirely to claimant n. As E increases from Gn¡1(c) to Gn¡2(c), equal
division of each increment prevails between claimants n and n ¡ 1...This
goes on until E reaches G1(c), after which each increment is divided equally
among all claimants, until all are fully compensated.
The four rules de¯ned in Section 2 are ICI rules and our ¯rst lemma
8identi¯es functions in HN that rationalize them as members of the family.5
Lemma 1 (Thomson, 2000) The following four rules are ICI rules:
(a) CEA: for each c 2 RN
+, set F(c) ´ (nc1;c1 + (n ¡ 1)c2;:::;c1 + c2 +
¢¢¢ + ck¡1 + (n ¡ k + 1)ck;:::;c1 + c2 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡2 + 2cn¡1).
(b) CEL: for each c 2 RN
+, set F(c) ´ (0;:::;0).
(c) T: for each c 2 RN























(d) MO: for each c 2 RN
+, set F(c) = (c1;c2;:::;cn¡1).
Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006a,b) propose and study a one-parameter
family of rules under the name of \Tal family". This family happens to be
a subfamily of the ICI family de¯ned by selecting µ 2 [0;1] and choosing
F(c) ´ µ(nc1;c1 +(n¡1)c2;:::;c1 +c2 +¢¢¢+ck¡1 +(n¡k +1)ck;:::;c1 +
c2 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡2 + 2cn¡1). Let T µ denote the rule associated with µ in this
manner. Note that T
1
2 = T, T 1 = CEA, and T 0 = CEL.
3.3 Reverse family: the CIC family
A reverse algorithm to the one underlying the de¯nition of the ICI family sug-
gests itself. Fix the claims vector. There, we began with equal division and
dropped claimants in succession, starting with the agents with the smallest
claims. Here, as the endowment increases from 0 to the sum of the claims, we
start by giving everything to claimant n and progressively enlarge the set of
recipients, introducing them in the order of decreasing claims. More precisely,
claimant n is the only one present until E reaches a ¯rst critical value|let
F1(c) denote this value|at which point claimant n ¡ 1 enters the scene.
Then, claimants n and n ¡ 1 share equally each increment until E reaches a
second critical value|let F2(c) denote this value. Then, claimants n, n ¡ 1,
and n¡2 share equally each increment, and so on. This process goes on until
claimant 1 enters the scene|let Fn¡1(c) denote the value of E at which this
occurs|at which point all claimants share equally each increment. At some
point|let Gn¡1(c) denote the value of E at which this occurs|claimant 1 is
fully compensated and is dropped o®. Then, equal division of each increment
prevails among claimants 2 through n until claimant 2 is fully compensated|
let Gn¡2(c) denote the value of E at which this occurs|and is dropped o®
and so on. During the last step, claimant n is the only one left.
5The alternative extension of Rabad's rule mentioned in footnote 2 is not an ICI rule.
9A member of the family de¯ned in this way can be described in terms of a
list of pairs of functions satisfying relations parallel to those imposed on the










k=1 is nowhere increasing, G1(c) ·
P
ci, and the following
relations, which we call the CIC relations, hold. The acronym CIC re°ects
the fact that each claimant's award is ¯rst Constant, then Increasing, then
Constant. For convenience, we introduce c0 ´ 0, F0(c) ´ 0, G0(c) ´
P
ci,






The CIC relations are imposed to guarantee that as the endowment
reaches the sum of the claims, each claimant is fully compensated. As for
the ICI family, the relations are not independent: multiplying the ¯rst one
through by n, the second one by n¡1, ..., and the last one by 1, gives new
relations whose sum is an identity. Also, if several agents have equal claims,
the CIC relations imply that successive Fk's are equal and that so are the
corresponding Gk's. Then, agents with equal claims come in and drop out
together.
Let ¹ HN denote the family of pairs of functions satisfying the CIC rela-
tions. We have the following formal de¯nition of the CIC family (Thomson,
2007a):
CIC rule relative to H ´ (Fk;Gk)
k=n¡1
k=1 2 ¹ HN, RH: For each c 2 RN
+
with c1 · ¢¢¢ · cn, the awards vector chosen by RH is calculated as follows.
As E ¯rst increases from 0 to F1(c), everything goes to claimant n. As
E increases from F1(c) to F2(c), equal division of each increment prevails
between claimants n and n ¡ 1. As E increases from F2(c) to F3(c), equal
division of each increment prevails among claimants n, n¡1, and n¡2...This
goes on until claimant 1 enters the scene, when E = Fn¡1(c), at which
point equal division of each increment prevails until, when E = Gn¡1(c), he
is fully compensated and is dropped o®. As E increases from Gn¡1(c) to
E = Gn¡2(c), equal division of each increment prevails among claimants 2
through n. Then, claimant 2 is fully compensated and is dropped o®...At
the end of the process, claimant n is the only one left, and he receives each
increment until he is fully compensated.
10The next lemma identi¯es three rules as CIC rules. The constrained
equal awards and constrained equal losses rules are two of them. The third
one is de¯ned like the Talmud rule, which can be seen as a \hybrid" of the
constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, by exchanging
the order in which these component rules are applied, with the half-claims
being used in the formulas instead of the claims themselves. For that reason,
we name it the reverse Talmud rule.6














where in each case, ¸ 2 R+ is chosen so as to achieve e±ciency.
Lemma 2 (Thomson, 2000) The following rules are CIC rules:
(a) CEA: for each c 2 RN
+, set F(c) ´ (0;0;:::;0).
(b) CEL: for each c 2 RN
+, set F(c) ´ (cn¡cn¡1;cn+cn¡1¡2cn¡2;:::;cn+
cn¡1 + ¢¢¢ + c2 ¡ (n ¡ 1)c1).
(c) T r: for each c 2 RN













2 + ¢¢¢ + cn




2 + ¢¢¢ + cn
2 ).
A counterpart of family fT µgµ2[0;1] can be de¯ned by reversing the order in
which the ideas of equal gains and equal losses are applied. For each c 2 RN
+,
set F(c) ´ µ(cn¡cn¡1;cn+cn¡1¡2cn¡2;:::;cn+cn¡1+¢¢¢+c2¡(n¡1)c1).
Let fUµgµ2[0;1] denote this family. Note that U
1
2 = T r, U0 = CEA, and
U1 = CEL.
4 Lorenz comparisons of ICI rules and of CIC
rules
Our ¯rst theorem formulates a simple su±ciency criterion on pairs of ICI
rules that tells us when they can be Lorenz ordered. It su±ces to check that
the F-sequence of one dominates the F-sequence of the other; equivalently,
that the G-sequence of one dominates the G-sequence of the other.
6It is discussed under that name by Chun, Schummer, and Thomson (2001) and Hokari
and Thomson (2003).
11Theorem 1 Let S and S0 be two ICI rules, associated with H ´ (F;G)
and H0 ´ (F 0;G0) 2 HN. If, for each k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g, F 0
k ¸ Fk, then S0
Lorenz dominates S. Equivalently, it su±ces that for each k 2 f1;:::;n¡1g,
G0
k ¸ Gk.
The proof essentially consists of two lemmas. Let x and x0 2 RN




i. We will use the fact that x0 ºL x if and only if one passes
from x to x0 by means of a sequence of Lorenz improving transfers.
Let c 2 RN
+. If all coordinates of c di®er, the passage from H to H0 can
be described as the composition of increases, for some k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g, of
the k-th component of the function F(c). If some of the coordinates of c are
equal, successive components of (Fk(c)) have to increase simultaneously.
Lemma 3 Let S and S0 be two ICI rules, associated with H = (F;G) and
H0 = (F 0;G0) 2 HN. If there are k 2 f1;:::;ng and ¹ k 2 f0;:::;n ¡ k ¡ 1g
such that Fk = ¢¢¢ = Fk+¹ k < F 0
k = ¢¢¢ = F 0
k+¹ k and for each ` = 2 fk;:::;k+¹ kg,
F` = F 0
`, then S0 Lorenz dominates S.
Proof: For each k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1, let ±k(c) ´ Gk(c) ¡ Fk(c). First, we show
that the sequence (±k(c))
n¡1
k=1 is independent of which ICI rule is considered.7
Indeed:
±1(c) = ¡(n ¡ 1)c1 + c2 + c3 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡1 + cn
±2(c) = ¡(n ¡ 2)c2 + c3 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡1 + cn
¢¢¢ = + ¢¢¢ + ¢¢¢ + cn¡1 + cn
±n¡2(c) = ¡2cn¡2 + cn¡1 + cn
±n¡1(c) = ¡cn¡1 + cn
Thus, the ICI rule associated with each (F;G) 2 HN is de¯ned, for each
c 2 R+, by the location of nested intervals in [0;
P
ci], I1(c) ´ [F1(c);G1(c)],
I2(c) ´ [F2(c);G2(c)], ..., In¡1(c) ´ [Fn¡1(c);Gn¡1(c)], of lengths ±1(c),
±2(c), ..., ±n¡1(c).
To prove the lemma, let us suppose that no two claims are equal, which
means that ¹ k = 0 in its statement. Since the calculations are performed for
each claims vector separately, we omit c as an argument of the Fk's and Gk's.
Let k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g, and consider the passage from Fk to F 0
k < Fk. We
show that for each E 2 [0;
P
ci], one passes from x ´ S(c;E) to x0 ´ S0(c;E)
by means of Lorenz improving transfers.
7In light of this fact, we could just as well have stated the theorem in terms of G and G0
instead of S and S0.
12Case 1: E 2 [0;Fk]. Then x0 = x and the conclusion holds trivially.
Case 2: E 2 [Fk;F 0
k]. Let ¢ ´ E ¡ Fk. Under S, this di®er-
ence is distributed equally among claimants k + 1;:::;n. Under S0, it
is distributed equally among claimants k;:::;n, whereas claimants 1, ...,
k ¡ 1's awards remain at the values they are given by both rules when
E = Fk. The di®erences between the successive partial sums for S0 and S, P
i=1;:::;m[S0
i(c;E) ¡ Si(c;E)], as m runs from 1 to n, are the following: the
¯rst k ¡1 di®erences are 0; then letting ` run from 0 to n¡k, the (k +`)-th
term is
¢(n¡k¡`)
(n¡k)(n¡k+1). It is important to note for Step 4 that the maximal
values of these di®erences are obtained for ¢¤ ´ F 0
k ¡ Fk (then E = F 0
k).
Case 3: E 2 [F 0
k;Gk]. As E increases in that interval, each increment is
distributed in the same fashion by both rules. Thus, the di®erences between
the successive partial sums remain what they are under Case 2 for E = F 0
k,
the greatest value of the endowment covered under that case.
Case 4: E 2 [Gk;G0
k]. (Here, claimant k reenters the distribution
later for S0 than for S.) Let ¹ ¢ ´ E ¡ G0
k. Under S, this di®erence is
distributed equally among claimants k;:::;n. Under S0, it is distributed
equally among claimants k + 1;:::;n. Starting from an endowment of Gk,
the contributions to the di®erences between the successive partial sums for
S0 and S of an increase of ¹ ¢ of the endowment are the following: the ¯rst
k ¡ 1 di®erences are 0; then letting ` run from 0 to n ¡ k, the (k + `)-th
term is
¢(`¡n+k)
(n¡k)(n¡k+1). The maximal values of these di®erences are obtained for
¢¤ ´ G0
k ¡ Gk (then E = G0
k). At that point and since by the ICI relations,
G0
k ¡ Gk = F 0
k ¡ Fk, these di®erences are the negative of the di®erences of
the values of the successive partial sums for S0 and S reached for E = F 0
k, so
that the successive partial sums are equal for both rules.
Case 5: E 2 [G0
k;
P
ci]. As E increases in that interval, each increment
is distributed in the same fashion by both rules. The successive partial sums
remain equal until E reaches
P
ci.
When several claims are equal, several adjacent parameters are equal for
all ICI rules. Then, to pass from one to the other, these parameters have
to be increased together. This requires a straightforward adaptation of the
calculations just made. If exactly ¹ k successive parameters are equal, starting
with the k-th one, Fk, the transfer is from claimants k;:::;k+¹ k to claimants
k + ¹ k + 1;:::;n initially, and later on, from claimants k + ¹ k + 1;:::;n to
claimants k;:::;k + ¹ k. ¤
13Lemma 4 One can pass from H to H0 by a succession of adjustments as
described in Lemma 3.
The proof is simple but not standard and it is notationally cumbersome,
so we will ¯rst illustrate it by means of examples, supposing initially that no
two claims are equal. Again, we drop c as an argument of the Fk's, the Gk's,
and the ±k's. Given two ICI rules S and S0, associated with H = (F;G)
and H0 = (F 0;G0) 2 HN, if F · F 0, then each interval Ik = [Fk;Gk] for
S lies to the left of the corresponding interval I0
k = [F 0
k;G0
k] for S0. (This
is possible because the interval have equal lengths, as we have seen). For
the two-claimant case, there is a single interval, and there are no nesting
constraints: one can pass from I1 to I0
1 in one step.
If n ¸ 3, more than one step may be needed. Suppose n = 3. Then there
are two intervals, I1 and I2. In each of the examples below, F1 = F2 = 0




ci (thus, S0 = CEA). This is the case
for which the required movements are the largest, and they give us an upper
bound on the number of steps. To preserve nesting, we move I1 to the right,
then I2, then I1 again, and so on.
Example 1 (Figure 1a): Let N ´ f1;2;3g and c ´ (4;5;6). Then, ±1 = 3
and ±2 = 1. The initial positions of the two intervals [F1;G1] and [F2;G2]
are labelled 0. Since their left endpoints are equal at ¯rst, we can only move
the upper one. The di®erence ±1 ¡ ±2 of their lengths is equal to 2. It is the
maximal amount by which we can move the upper interval. The result of this
¯rst move is labelled 1. Once this is done, we can move the lower interval,
by a maximal amount also equal to ±1 ¡ ±2 = 2. The result of this second
move is labelled 2. We now return to the higher interval. Once again, we can
move it by the same amount. The result of this third move is labelled 3. We
continue in this manner until the right endpoints of both intervals are
P
ci.
Altogether, for the example, we need 13 steps. (The successive values of the
left endpoints of the two intervals are (0;0), (0;2), (2;2), (2;4), (4;4), (4;6),
(6;6), (6;8), (8;8), (8;10), (10;10), (10;12), (12;12), (12;13).)
Example 2 (Figure 1b): Let N ´ f1;2;3g and c ´ (1;2;12). Then, ±1 = 12
and ±2 = 10. The sum of the claims is the same as in Example 1 but we need
fewer steps to pass from the constrained equal losses rule to the constrained
equal awards rule. The di®erence ±1 ¡ ±2 is still equal to 2, but because ±1 is
close to
P





























































































Figure 1: Illustrating Lemma 4. (a) Example 1. (b) Example 2. (c) Ex-
ample 3. The intervals I1 and I2 are represented as horizontal segments at two
heights. Their successive positions are numbered, starting with \0". At Step 1,
we move the higher interval to the right, labelling its new position \1". At Step 2,
we move the lower interval to the right, labelling its new position \2", and so
on. (d) For Example 4, there are three intervals, at three di®erent heights, I1, I2,
and I3. Since c2 = c3, I2 and I3 have equal lengths, and we have to move them
together.
15the left endpoints of the two intervals are (0;0), (0;2), (2;2), (2;4), (3;4),
(3;5).)
Example 3 (Figure 1c): Let N ´ f1;2;3g and c ´ (1;6;8). Then, ±1 = 12
and ±2 = 2. The higher interval has to move by a large amount but because
the di®erence ±1 ¡ ±2 is larger than for Example 2, at each step, the higher
interval can move by a larger amount. (The 3 successive values of the left
endpoints of the two intervals are (0;0), (0;10), (3;10), (3;13).)
These examples show that when claims are all distinct, we can move each
interval by the di®erence between the (positive) lengths of two successive
intervals. Since the distance by which we have to move any interval is ¯nite,
we need a ¯nite number of steps. The next example is one for which two
claims are equal. Then, we have to move two successive intervals together.
Example 4 (Figure 1d): Let N ´ f1;2;3;4g and c ´ (4;5;5;8). Then,
±1 = 6 and ±2 = ±3 = 3. Here, two intervals have equal lengths, so we
have to move them together. (The 13 successive values of the left end-
points of the three intervals are (0;0;0), (0;3;3), (3;3;3), (3;6;6), (6;6;6),
(6;9;9), (9;9;9), (9;12;12), (12;12;12), (12;15;15), (15;15;15), (15;18;18),
(16;18;18), (16;19;19).)
We can now generalize the process just described to prove Lemma 4.
Proof: (of Lemma 4) The proof is by induction on the number of claimants.
The assertion is true for two claimants as there is only one interval then, and
we can move it to its required position in one step. Suppose the assertion
is true for n ¡ 1 claimants. We prove it for n claimants. We undertake
a sequence of moves of intervals to the right. Suppose ¯rst that all claims
are distinct. We move In¡1 and In¡2 in turn. Moving In¡2 by any amount
may require moving In¡3, ..., I1 ¯rst but by the induction hypothesis, this
requires ¯nitely many steps. If at any step, one of the intervals Ik reaches the
position I0
k, we stop for that interval, and the exercise splits into two parts:
one of them involves all claimants ` > k and the other involves all claimants
` < k. We proceed with each group separately but for each of them, by the
induction hypothesis, the number of required steps is ¯nite.
The sum of the maximal movements of In¡1 and In¡2 during the ¯rst two
steps is given by the di®erence ±n¡1 ¡ ±n¡2 = 2(cn¡1 ¡ cn¡2) > 0. At each of
the next steps, we can move either one or the other of these intervals by this
16di®erence. As the distance by which we have to move each of them is ¯nite,
we need ¯nitely many steps. Altogether, we can therefore move all intervals
from their initial to their ¯nal positions in ¯nitely many steps.
If some claims are equal, we have to move some intervals together, but
this can only accelerate the process.
That S0 Lorenz dominate S if for each k 2 f1;:::;n¡1g, G0
k ¸ Gk, follows
from the facts that Lorenz domination holds if for each k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g,
F 0
k ¸ Fk, and that the sequence (±)
k=n¡1
k=1 ´ (Gk ¡ Fk)
k=n¡1
k=1 is the same for
all members of the family, as established in Lemma 3. ¤
Proof: (of Theorem 1). It is a direct consequence of Lemmas 3 and 4 ¤
The following Lorenz rankings of several rules can be obtained as easy
corollaries of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 (a) The constrained equal awards rule Lorenz dominates all ICI
rules.
(b) All ICI rules Lorenz dominate the constrained equal losses rule.
(c) The Talmud rule Lorenz dominates the minimal overlap rule.
(d) For each pair fµ1;µ2g of elements of [0;1], if µ1 · µ2, then T µ2 Lorenz
dominates T µ1.
Proof: Given an ICI rule S, let us use the notation HS = (F S;GS) 2 HN for
the function associated with it. We show that in each case, the inequalities
of Theorem 1 are met.
(a) For each ICI rule S, we have F CEA = 0 · F S.
(b) The sequences (F T
k )
k=n¡1
k=1 and (F MO
k )
k=n¡1
k=1 are given in Lemma 1. We



















2 + ¢¢¢ + ¢¢¢ + 2
cn¡1
2 ¸ cn¡1
The ¯rst inequality is obviously satis¯ed. The remaining ones can be
written, for each k = 2;:::;n ¡ 1, as
Pk¡1
`=1 c` + (n ¡ k + 1)ck ¸ 0.
(c) Here, it is simpler to compare the Gk's. For each ICI rule S, we have





17(d) The functions F µ1 and F µ2 are non-negative and proportional. Thus,
they trivially satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 1. ¤
We need to introduce additional properties of rules to relate Corollary 1 to
existing literature. Order preservation of awards (Aumann and Maschler,
1985) says that for each problem, given any two claimants, the one with the
larger claim should be awarded at least as much as the one with the smaller
claim, and order preservation of losses (Aumann and Maschler, 1985)
says that the former should incur a loss that is at least as large as the loss
incurred by the latter. Order preservation is the conjunction of the two
requirements.
Parts (a) and (b) of Corollary 1 are not the interesting ones, as more
general results are obviously true: the constrained equal awards rule Lorenz
dominates all rules and the constrained equal losses rule is dominated by all
rules satisfying order preservation (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006b, state
the ¯rst of these results for rules satisfying order preservation, this property
being incorporated in their de¯nition of a rule, but (a) holds without it;
Bosmans and Lauwers, 2007, state a related result). Bosmans and Lauwers
(2007) obtain (c) as a corollary of a result stating that the minimal overlap
rule is Lorenz minimal in a class of rules satisfying a certain list of properties,
all of which are satis¯ed by the Talmud rule.8 A direct proof of Part (d) is
the object of Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006b).
A parallel conclusion to that of Theorem 1 holds for the CIC family. The
proof is parallel too. The only di®erence is that at each step, the transfer is
8Consider the family of rules satisfying the reasonable lower bound (which says that
each agent's award should be at least as large as 1=n times his claim truncated at the
endowment (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004; Dominguez and Thomson, 2006), order
preservation, order preservation under claims variations (which says that if some agent's
claim increases, given two other agents, the one with the larger claim should incur a loss
that is at least as large as the loss incurred by the one with the smaller claim; Thomson,
2007b), and limited consistency (which says that if an agent's claim is 0 and he leaves,
the awards to the other claimants should not be a®ected; Section 5 is devoted to a study
of consistent rules.) Bosmans and Lauwers show that the minimal overlap rule is Lorenz
dominated by all rules satisfying these properties; moreover, it is the only rule to be so
dominated. All ICI rules satisfy order preservation, but not all satisfy the reasonable lower
bound, the constrained equal losses rule being an example of one that does not. Also, an
ICI rule satis¯es order preservation under claims variations only for some choices of the
function specifying the breakpoints. Finally an ICI rule satis¯es limited consistency only
if its components are appropriately related.
18from one claimant to several others, instead of from several claimants to one
of them.
Theorem 2 Let S and S0 be two CIC rules, associated with H ´ (F;G) and
H0 ´ (F 0;G0) 2 ¹ HN. If, for each k 2 f1;:::;n¡1g, F 0
k · Fk, then S0 <L S.
Equivalently, it su±ces that for each k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g, G0
k · Gk.
Proof: We omit the details, as the proof is parallel to that of Theorem 1.
It involves the observation that each CIC rule can be described by means of
nested intervals whose lengths are independent of which member of the family
is considered, as was the case for the ICI family. For each k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1,
let ²k(c) ´ Gk(c) ¡ Fk(c). For each member of the CIC family, the sequence
(²k(c))
n¡1
k=1, which we calculate from the CIC relations, is given by:9
²1(c) = c1 + c2 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡3 + cn¡2 + 2cn¡1
²2(c) = c1 + c2 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡3 + 3cn¡2
¢¢¢ = ¢¢¢ + ¢¢¢ + ¢¢¢ + ¢¢¢
²n¡2(c) = c1 + (n ¡ 1)c2
²n¡1(c) = nc1
¤
5 Lorenz comparisons of consistent rules
Next, we turn to the family of rules satisfying the following requirement.
Consider a rule and apply it to some problem. Then, imagine that a group
of claimants take their awards and leave. Reassess the situation at this point.
It can be seen as the problem of allocating among the remaining claimants
the sum of the amounts initially awarded to them. Reapply the rule to solve
this problem. The requirement is that the rule should assign to each of them
the same amount as it did initially. It expresses the robustness of the rule
\under partial implementation".
For a formal statement, one has to generalize the model so as to allow
variations in the population of claimants. Let there be an in¯nite set of
\potential" claimants, indexed by the natural numbers, N. In each given
9We have ±1 + ²n¡1 = ±2 + ²n¡2 = ¢¢¢ = ±n¡1 + ²1 =
P
ci.
19problem, however, only a ¯nite number of them are present. Let N be the
class of ¯nite subsets of N. A (claims) problem is a pair (c;E) 2 RN
+ £R+,
where N 2 N, such that
P
N ci ¸ E. A rule is a function de¯ned over S
N2N CN consisting of all problems involving some population in N, which
associates with each N 2 N and each (c;E) 2 CN a vector in X(c;E).
Given N 2 N, we refer to the restriction of a rule to the subdomain CN as
its \N-component".
Consistency: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each N0 ½ N, if
x ´ S(c;E), then xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xi).
It follows from the de¯nition of a rule that the pair (cN0;
P
N0 xi) is a
well-de¯ned problem, so it is meaningful to apply S to it.
In this section, what we call an \ICI rule" or a \CIC rule" is a rule whose
components are rules as de¯ned in Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. A
characterization of the family of ICI rules that are consistent is available
(Thomson, 2007a). Let e : R ! R be the identity function. Let ¡ be the
class of nowhere decreasing functions °: R+ ! R+, the function e¡° being
also nowhere decreasing, such that °(0) = 0. (These requirements imply
that ° is continuous.) To each ° 2 ¡ we associate the ICI rule S° de¯ned
by setting F(c) ´ (n°(~ c1);°(~ c1) + (n ¡ 1)°(~ c2);:::;°(~ c1) + °(~ c2) + ¢¢¢ +
°(~ cn¡2) + 2°(~ cn¡1)), G(c) being obtained from F(c) by means of the ICI
relations. This family of consistent ICI rules|we call them ICI* rules|
includes the constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and Talmud
rules. In fact, it contains the entire Moreno-Ternero{Villar (2006a) family.
(The minimal overlap rule is not consistent however.)
The form taken for ICI* rules by the su±ciency criterion of Theorem 1
is particularly simple. Moreover, it becomes necessary.
Theorem 3 Let ° and °0 2 ¡. Then, S° Lorenz dominates S°0 if and only
if ° ¸ °0.
Proof: The su±ciency part is a consequence of Theorem 1. Conversely,
suppose that there is c0 2 R+ such that °(c0) < °0(c0). Let N ´ f1;2g and
c 2 RN
+ such that c1 = c0 and c2 > c0. It is easy to see that the path of
S° for c lies to the northwest of the path of S°0 for c, so in fact, for each
E 2 [0;
P
ci], S°0(c;E) Lorenz dominates S°(c;E). ¤
20A parallel characterization of the consistent members of the CIC family is
available too (Thomson, 2007a). These rules|which we call CIC* rules|
are also indexed by the members of ¡: To each ° 2 ¡ we associate the CIC
rule R° de¯ned by setting F(c) ´ (°(~ cn)¡°(~ cn¡1), °(~ cn)+°(~ cn¡1)¡2°(~ cn¡2),
..., °(~ cn) + °(~ cn¡1) + ¢¢¢ + °(~ c2) ¡ (n ¡ 1)°(~ c1)), G(c) being obtained from
F(c) by means of the CIC relations. We have the following counterpart of
Theorem 3. We omit the proof.
Theorem 4 Let ° and °0 2 ¡. Then, R° Lorenz dominates R°0 if and only
if for each pair fa;bg 2 R+ with a < b, °(b) ¡ °(a) · °0(b) ¡ °0(a).
More can be said about Lorenz domination within the class of consistent
rules. Since consistency relates the components of a rule across populations,
one may hope that a behavior of a rule for low cardinalities would extend to
higher cardinalities. This observation motivates the following de¯nition. A
property of a rule is lifted if whenever a rule satis¯es it in the two-claimant
case and is consistent, then it satis¯es it in general (Hokari and Thomson,
2000). There is a practical advantage to a property being lifted: to prove
that a consistent rule satis¯es it, it su±ces to prove that it does so in the
usually less cumbersome, often trivial, case of two claimants.
Some properties are not lifted on their own but they are lifted if the rule
satis¯es some additional property (properties). Resource monotonicity,
which says that for each claims vector, if the endowment increases, each
claimant should receive at least as much as he did initially, has been most
helpful in assisting the lifting of properties (again, see Hokari and Thomson,
2000).
We propose here to extend the lifting and assisted lifting ideas to order
relations on pairs of rules. Given an order º on the space of rules, the order
is lifted if for each pair S, S0 of rules, if S º S0 in the two-claimant case
and both rules are consistent, then S º S0 in general. Our next theorem de-
scribes circumstances under which the Lorenz order is lifted. In fact, we only
require rules to satisfy bilateral consistency, the property obtained from
consistency by restricting the group of remaining agents to be of size two.
Theorem 5 Let S and S0 be two rules satisfying order preservation of awards
in the two-claimant case, resource monotonicity in the two-claimant case, and
bilateral consistency.10 Then, if S Lorenz dominates S0 in the two-claimant
10These two properties are lifted by bilateral consistency.
21case, in fact S Lorenz dominates S0 in general.
Proof: Let N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN. Let x ´ S(c;E) and x0 ´ S0(c;E).
To simplify notation, suppose N ´ f1;:::;ng and c1 · ¢¢¢ · cn. Since
S and S0 satisfy order preservation of awards, x1 · ¢¢¢ · xn and x0
1 ·
¢¢¢ · x0
n. Suppose that x does not Lorenz dominate x0. Then, there is





`=1 x`. Let i be the smallest index for which
this is the case. Obviously, x0






there is j 2 N with j > i such that x0
j < xj. Let N0 ´ fi;jg. Since S





j). Let y ´ S0(ci;cj;xi +xj). If x0
i +x0
j ·




j > xi+xj, then since S is resource monotonic in the two-claimant
case, yj · x0
j < xj. Since S and S0 satisfy order preservation of awards,
xi · xj and yi · yj. In either case, we conclude that (yi;yj) ÂL (xi;xj).
Thus, it is not true that S ÂL S0 in the two-claimant case. ¤
Next, we explain how to check Lorenz domination of various rules in the
two-claimant case. The path of awards of a rule for a claims vector
is the locus of the awards vector it chooses as the endowment varies from 0
to the sum of the claims. In the two-claimant case, S ºL S0 if for each
N ´ fi;jg, each c 2 RN
+ with ci < cj, and each 0 · E ·
P
ci, S(c;E) is
closer than S0(c;E) to the intersection of the line of equation ti+tj = E with
the 45± line. For rules satisfying order preservation of awards, and measuring
the smaller claim and the award to its owner on the horizontal axis (thus,
measuring the larger claim and the award to its owner on the vertical axis),
this means that the path of awards of S for c lies to the southeast of the path
of S0 for c (Figure 2a).
Since many rules are consistent, we will derive a number of Lorenz rank-
ings as corollaries of Theorem 5. Some pertain to rules not introduced yet.
First is the rule for which awards are proportional to claims:
Proportional rule, P: For each (c;E) 2 CN,
P(c;E) ´ ¸c;


























































Figure 2: Illustrating Corollary 2. Let N ´ f1;2g, and c 2 RN
+ be such
that c1 < c2. (a) If S Lorenz dominates S0 and both rules satisfy order preserva-
tion of awards, the path of S for c lies to the southeast of the path of S0 for c.
(b) Paths of awards of several standard rules. (c) Paths of two members of the
family fTµgµ2[0;1]. (d) Paths of two members of the family fUµgµ2[0;1].
Another rule is de¯ned by applying the constrained equal awards rule
\twice", using the half-claims instead of the claims themselves in the formula
(for the Talmud rule, there is a switch from the constrained equal awards
formula to the constrained equal losses formula, instead of the same formula
being used twice).












where in each case, ¸ 2 R+ is chosen so as to achieve e±ciency.
We refer to the rule de¯ned in a similar way but instead applying the
constrained equal losses formula twice, as the reverse of Piniles' rule. We
omit the formal de¯nition. Like the constrained equal awards rule, our ¯nal
rule is motivated by egalitarian objectives, but under tighter constraints:
Constrained egalitarian rule, CE (Chun, Schummer, and Thomson,











where in each case, ¸ 2 R+ is chosen so as to achieve e±ciency.
23Corollary 2 (a) The constrained equal awards rule Lorenz dominates all
bilaterally consistent rules.
(b) The constrained equal losses rule is Lorenz dominated by all bilaterally
consistent rules satisfying order preservation.
(c) Piniles' rule Lorenz dominates the Talmud, proportional, and reverse
Talmud rules.
(d) The constrained egalitarian rule Lorenz dominates Piniles' rule.
(e) The Talmud, proportional, and reverse Talmud rules Lorenz dominate
the reverse of Piniles' rule.
(f) For each pair fµ1;µ2g of elements of [0;1], if µ1 < µ2, then T µ2 Lorenz
dominates T µ1.
(g) For each pair fµ1;µ2g of elements of [0;1], if µ1 < µ2, then Uµ1 Lorenz
dominates Uµ2.
Given x1;x2;:::;xk 2 RN, let bro:seg[x1;x2;:::;xk] be the broken
segment connecting these points in that order.
Proof: The proof that all of the rules mentioned in the corollary satisfy
the properties of Theorem 5 is direct and we omit it. (Some of these facts
are proved by Young, 1987, and some by Thomson, 2007c.) To establish
the Lorenz domination statements for two claimants, we inspect paths of
awards. They are illustrated in Figures 2b,c,d for N ´ f1;2g and c 2 RN
+
with c1 < c2.
² The path of the constrained equal awards rule is bro:seg[0;a;c]. It is
closer to the 45± line than the path of any rule, consistent or not. This
proves (a).
² The path of the constrained equal losses rule is bro:seg[0;a;c]. It lies
further from the 45± line than the path of any rule satisfying order preserva-
tion, consistent or not. This proves (b).11
For statements (c)-(e), and as each of the rules involved satis¯es order
preservation of awards, to prove that some rule S Lorenz dominates some
other rule S0, it su±ces to check, as we noted earlier, that the path of S lies
to the southeast of the path of S0. We simply enumerate the paths, leaving to
the reader the trivial veri¯cation that this geometric relation between them
does hold.
² The path of Piniles' rule is bro:seg[0;d; c
2;f;c] (Figure 2b).
11It would not su±ce to restrict attention to the class of rules satisfying order preser-
vation of losses.
24² The path of the Talmud rule is bro:seg[0;d;e;c] (Figure 2b).
² The path of the proportional rule is seg[0;c] (Figure 2b).
² The path of the reverse Talmud rule is seg[0;h;f;c] (Figure 2b).
² For the constrained egalitarian rule, two cases have to be distinguished.
If 2c1 < c2, its path is bro:seg[0;d; c
2;g;c]. This is the case represented in
Figure 2b. If 2c1 > c2, let m be the point where the horizontal segment ema-
nating from c
2 meets the 45± line and p be the point where this line meets the
vertical segment passing through c. Then, the path is bro:seg[0;d; c
2;m;p;c].
² The path of the reverse of Piniles' rule is bro:seg[0;h; c
2;e;c] (Figure 2b).
For statements (f) and (g), we note the following:
² The path of T µ is bro:seg[µ(c1;c1);(µc1;c2 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)c1;c] (Figure 2c).
² The path of Uµ is bro:seg[(0;µ(c2¡c1);(c1;(1¡µ)c1+µc2;c] (Figure 2d).
¤
Statements (a) and (b) of Corollary 2 are not the interesting ones since,
as we have seen, the constrained equal awards rule Lorenz dominates all
rules, whether they are consistent or not, and the constrained equal losses
rule is dominated by all rules satisfying order preservation, whether they are
consistent or not, but we have included them for completeness. Bosmans and
Lauwers (2007) obtain the ¯rst two statements in (c) and (d).12 We noted
earlier that Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006b) provide a direct proof of (f).
So, together with Corollary 1d, we now have three proofs of this statement.
Consider the requirement on a rule that when the endowment is equal to
the half-sum of the claims, it should select the vector of half-claims (Chun,
Schummer, and Thomson, 2001). This midpoint property is obviously
implied by self-duality. It fact, it is considerably weaker as it applies, for
each claims vector, to only one endowment, instead of to in¯nitely many
pairs of endowments. Using the logic of Theorem 5, one can show that if two
rules S and S0 satisfy the midpoint property in addition to the hypotheses of
this theorem, then if S Lorenz dominates S0 on the subclass of two-claimant
problems in which the endowment is at most as large as the half-sum of
the claims, then S Lorenz dominates S0 on this \lower half-domain" for
12Bosmans and Lauwers (2007) also o®er Lorenz comparisons involving the random
arrival rule (O'Neill, 1982) and the adjusted proportional rule (Curiel, Maschler and Tijs,
1987). They are not covered here, since neither rule is a member of the three families
we consider (except for two claimants because in that case, these rules coincide with the
Talmud rule).
25arbitrarily many claimants. A similar statement holds for the \higher half-
domain" de¯ned in parallel manner. As corollaries, one obtains that on the
lower half-domain, Piniles' rule and the Talmud rule Lorenz dominate the
proportional rule, which itself Lorenz dominates the reverse Talmud rule.
On the higher half-domain, the reverse Talmud rule and Piniles' rule Lorenz
dominate the proportional rule, which itself Lorenz dominates the Talmud
rule. Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006b) and Bosmans and Lauwers (2007)
also establish Lorenz rankings on these half-domains.
6 Lorenz comparisons and operators
An operator on the space of rules is a mapping that associates with each
rule another one. A systematic investigation of operators is undertaken
by Thomson and Yeh (2001). Central are the following three. Given a
rule S, the claims truncation operator associates with S the rule St
de¯ned by ¯rst truncating claims at the endowment, then applying S: call-
ing ti(c;E) ´ minfci;Eg and t(c;E) ´ (ti(c;E))i2N, we have St(c;E) ´
S(t(c;E);E). The attribution of minimal rights operator associates
with S the rule Sm de¯ned by ¯rst assigning to each claimant the di®erence
between the endowment and the sum of the claims of the other claimants,
if this di®erence is non-negative, and 0 otherwise, then applying S: calling
mi(c;E) ´ maxfE ¡
P
j2Nnfig cj;0g and m(c;E) ´ (mi(c;E))i2N, we have
Sm(c;E) ´ m(c;E)+S(c¡m(c;E);E ¡
P
mi(c;E)). The duality opera-
tor associates with S the rule Sd that treats the endowment as S treats the
de¯cit: Sd(c;E) ´ c ¡ S(c;
P
ci ¡ E).
Given an operator p and a rule S, let Sp be the rule obtained by subjecting
S to p. Given an order º on the space of rules, operator p preserves the
order if for each pair of rules S, S0 such that S º S0, then Sp º S0p. It
reverses it if for each pair of rules S, S0 such that S º S0, then S0p º S0p
We have the following theorem. Part (c) is also noted by Bosmans and
Lauwers (2007).
Theorem 6 (a) The claims truncation operator preserves the Lorenz order.
(b) So does the attribution of minimal rights operator for any two rules
satisfying order preservation.
(c) The duality operator reverses it.
26Proof: Let S and S0 be two rules such that S ºL S0. Let N 2 N and
(c;E) 2 CN.
(a) We have St(c;E) = S(t(c;E);E) ºL S0(t(c;E);E) = S0t(c;E).
(b) Suppose N ´ f1;:::;ng and c1 · ¢¢¢ · cn. We need to com-
pare Sm(c;E) = m(c;E) + S(c ¡ m(c;E);
P
ci ¡ E) and S0m(c;E) =
m(c;E) + S0(c ¡ m(c;E);
P
ci ¡ E). Obviously, m1(c;E) · ¢¢¢ · mn(c;E)
and a simple calculation shows that c1 ¡ m1(c;E) · ¢¢¢ · cn ¡ mn(c;E)
(Thomson, 2007c). Thus, since S and S0 satisfy order preservation, S1(c ¡
m(c;E);E ¡
P












mi(c;E)) · ¢¢¢ · mn(c;E)+
Sn(c¡m(c;E);E¡
P
mi(c;E)) and similarly, m1(c;E)+S0
1(c¡m(c;E);E¡ P
mi(c;E)) · ¢¢¢ · mn(c;E) + S0
n(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mi(c;E)). Since






k(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mi(c;E)). For each k = 1;:::;n, the k-th par-
tial sums for Sm(c;E) and S0m(c;E) are obtained from these partial sums
by adding the same quantity
Pk
i=1 mi(c;E). Thus, the inequalities between
them are preserved and Sm ºL S0m.
(c) We omit the obvious proof for the duality operator. ¤
Given any rule, one may also ask whether it can be Lorenz compared to
the rule obtained by subjecting it to a particular operator. The following
theorem provides an answer. Claims monotonicity of a rule says that
whenever an agent's claim decreases, he should receive at most as much as
he did initially. We may be interested in restricting the impact this increase
has on the other agents' awards. In the aggregate, they cannot receive less,
but we may require that in fact, each should receive at least as much as he
did initially. The requirement is considered by Thomson (2007c) under the
name of others-oriented claims monotonicity. Generalizing the idea to
possible decreases in the claims of several agents at once, we require that each
of the other agents should receive at least as much as he did initially (which
implies that at least one of the agents whose claim decreases should receive
at most as much as he did initially).13 Let us call this requirement strong
others-oriented claims monotonicity. Most rules satisfy it. Also, say
that two properties are dual if whenever a rule satis¯es one of them, the
13The requirement that each of the agents whose claim decreases should receive at most
as much as he did initially is very strong, as it covers the case when one of these agents
experiences a very small decrease in his claim. His award should be allowed to increase.
27dual rule satis¯es the other. The dual of strong others-oriented monotonicity
(we do not attempt to ¯nd a name for it) says that if the claims of several
agents decrease and the endowment decreases by the sum of the decreases of
these claims, then each of the agents whose claims do not change receives at
least as much as he did initially. Most rules satisfy this requirement too.
Theorem 7 (a) Let S be a rule satisfying order preservation and strong
others-oriented claims monotonicity. Then, S is Lorenz dominated by the
rule obtained by subjecting S to the claims truncation operator.
(b) Let S be a rule satisfying order preservation and the dual of strong
others-oriented claims monotonicity. Then, S Lorenz dominates the rule
obtained by subjecting S to the attribution of minimal rights operator.
Proof: (a) Let S be rule satisfying the hypotheses. Let N 2 N, (c;E) 2 CN,
x ´ S(c;E), and N0 ´ fi 2 N : ci > Eg. In the problem (t(c;E);E), the
claim of each agent i 2 N0 is truncated at E. Let y ´ S(t(c;E);E). By
strong others-oriented monotonicity, for each i 2 N n N0, yi ¸ xi, which
implies that there is i 2 N0 such that yi · xi. By equal treatment of equals,
which order preservation implies, for each pair i;j 2 N0, yi = yj ´ a. Thus,
there is j 2 N0 such that for each k 2 N0 such that ck < cj|let N00 denote
this set, which could be empty|yk = a > xk, and for each k 2 N0 such that
ck ¸ cj, yk = a · xk. As the order of claims is not reversed by truncation,
the successive sums of ordered coordinates of x and y involve the same sets
of claimants. The agents listed ¯rst are the members of (N n N0) [ N00,
whose awards can only increase, and the agents listed next are the members
of N0 n N00, whose awards can only decrease. Then, an obvious calculation
shows that y ÂL x.
(b) This statement follows from (a) by dual reasoning. It exploits the
fact that after attribution of minimal rights, the revised claims of all agents
whose minimal rights are positive are equal. ¤
7 Conclusion
A wide range of properties have been formulated to evaluate rules. The
results described here provide us with another tool in this evaluation process.
The Lorenz order on the space of vectors is incomplete|that is, two awards
vectors for a given problem may not be comparable in this order|yet we have
found a large number of pairs of rules that can be Lorenz ordered uniformly,
28independently of the number of claimants, the values of their claims, and the
endowment. More importantly, we hope that the techniques we developed
to obtain these results throw useful light on the reasons for these rankings,
and that they will help obtain others.
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